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Response by Nicolas Véron to the Financial Reporting Council’s Discussion Paper 




Mr Julian Rose  
Financial Reporting Council 
5
th Floor - 79-91 Aldwych 
London WC2B 4HN 
United Kingdom 
 
Brussels, 4 August 2006 
 
 
Dear Sir,  
In May 2006, The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) issued a discussion paper on “Choice in the UK Audit 
Market”
1,  following  the  study  it  had  jointly  commissioned  with  the  United  Kingdom’s  Department  of 
Trade  and  Industry  (DTI)
2.  It  is  my  pleasure  to  hereby  respond  to  the  FRC’s  consultation  on  its 
discussion paper.  
The introductory development and answers to the FRC’s questions, enclosed in this letter, are my own 
personal views. This document should not be seen as reflecting in any way the views of Bruegel as an 
institution nor of Bruegel’s members.  
 
An Unusual Competition Issue of Major Importance 
The current state of concentration of the market of audit services for large international companies, with 
only  four  networks  of  firms
3  covering  almost  the  entire  market,  has  been  a  source  of  international 
concern ever since the fall of Arthur Andersen in early 2002. It was called “a national problem” by the 
former Chairman of the US Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), William Donaldson
4. Among other 
similar expressions  of  unease,  the  Accounting  and  Auditing  Practices  Committee of  the  International 
Corporate Governance Network issued a “Statement of Concern” in 2005, which depicted the current 
state of affairs regarding the structure of the audit market as “deeply unsatisfactory”
5.  
This is not a competition issue in the usual sense, because the relationship between an issuer and an 
auditor cannot be reduced to its commercial component. On the auditor-client relationship, the DTI-FRC 
document and previous publications, most notably a report of the US Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) in July 2003
6, have highlighted the absence of evidence of broad anti-competitive behavior
7 and 
                                                 
1 Available at http://www.frc.org.uk/press/pub1104.html.  
2 “Competition and Choice in the UK Audit Market”, report prepared by Oxera Consulting Ltd for DTI and FRC, April 
2006; available at http://www.frc.org.uk/press/pub1083.html.  
3 Universally known as the “Big Four”: Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
4 Quoted in “The Big Four: Too Few to Fail?”, BusinessWeek, 1 September 2003.  
5  http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/aap/audit_market_structure.php.  I  am  a  member  of  the  ICGN’s 
Accounting and Auditing Practices Committee.  
6  US  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO),  “Public  Accounting  Firms:  Mandated  Study  on  Consolidation  and 
Competition”,  report  pursuant  to  Section  701  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act,  July  2003;  available  on 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf.  
7 Evidence of significant anti-competitive behavior by the Big Four firms was found in 2000 in Italy, but this could be 
linked to country-specific regulatory features and it does not seem that the practices identified in that case have  
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of  any  direct  negative  consequences  for  clients,  such  as  unduly  high  prices  or  low  quality  of  client 
service, of the concentration of the market. They also established that the issue of choice is essentially 
limited to the market for audit services to large international companies: on most other segments of the 
broader audit market, non-Big Four firms are present and compete with the Big Four firms.  
However,  the  same  reports  have  also  firmly  established  that  in  the  current  regulatory  environment, 
market  forces  alone  are  unlikely  to  modify  the  structure  of  the  market  for  audit  services  to  large 
international companies and specifically to increase the level of choice in this market. This goes to the 
central issue of this debate, which is the relationship between choice, audit quality, and the resulting 
quality of public financial information disclosed by large international companies.  
The auditor works not only for the issuer which is its client, but also for shareholders and other financial 
partners  and  stakeholders,  which  all  have  an  interest  in  the  quality  of  the  issuer’s  public  financial 
reporting. And even beyond this already wide constituency, the auditor’s job is also part of the general 
framework  of  trust  that  supports  the  financial  system,  and  whose  disappearance  could  have  severe 
consequences  on  financial  markets  and  on  the  economy.  Therefore,  audit  services  have  a  major 
collective-interest component besides the commercial one, which explains why the audit profession is 
regulated in most countries. As a corollary, the main concern about the degree of concentration of the 
market for audit services to large international companies is about its impact on audit quality, not on 
price or other commercial features of the service provided by audit firms to issuers.  
Whether  the  issue  of  choice  is  currently  serious  enough  to  call  for  specific  measures  is  a  debated 
question. One aspect is whether there are cases in which the combination between the limited number 
of firms and the rules limiting the range of services that one firm can offer to an audit client results in 
the undue limitation or outright absence of choice. Beyond the DTI-FRC report, more comprehensive 
research would help knowing the extent of such situations, including outside the UK. Another aspect of 
the choice issue is whether the limited number of firms leads to a weakening of incentives for audit 
quality.  I  share  what  appears  to  be  a  wide  consensus  among  market  participants,  that  a  market 
structure in which the number of firms able to audit large international companies would have decreased 
from four to three would be undesirable. To avoid such an outcome, there can be a suspicion that in the 
event of a failure of audit quality that could call into question the reputation of one of the Big Four firms, 
regulators and other players would not subject that firm to the same vigorous oversight as would have 
been the case otherwise. This is the so-called too-few-to-fail argument.  
Although there is no evidence that regulators have been unduly lenient, some developments which all 
happened after the demise of Arthur Andersen do not appear to contradict the too-few-to-fail argument. 
When  the  SEC  tried  KPMG  in  January  2003  on  past  fraud  in  the  accounts  of  Xerox,  one  SEC 
spokesperson  felt  appropriate  to  state  that  "no  one  here  wants  to  see  KPMG  disappear"
8.  Similar 
concerns were heard in connection with Parmalat in 2003 and 2004, when nobody wanted Deloitte to 
collapse in spite of its name being associated with a very serious fraud case. And as several partners of 
KPMG  were  found  to  be  involved  in  unlawful  tax-shelter  schemes  in  2005,  senior  U.S.  Justice 
Department officials expressed concern, as did the United Kingdom's financial Services Authority
9. In 
this  context,  the  FRC’s  effort  to  explore  possible  avenues  for  increasing  choice  is  legitimate  and 
welcome.  
 
Exploring Possible Future Steps 
Given the previously expressed concerns about the structure of the market, there are two main ways to 
look at possible future steps to increase choice.  
￿  The first approach focuses on the number of firms. It primarily aims to increase the count of audit 
firms that are active in the market, so as to restore sufficient choice as arguably existed as late as 
the mid-1990s. The idea here is that once a situation is created where, say, at least six or seven 
networks are able to audit large international companies instead of the current four, then it can be 
ensured that this number does not later decrease back to four. This “firm-count” approach calls for a 
one-off  move  to  increase  the  number  of  market  participants  and  for  careful  oversight  in  the 
following period.  
                                                                                                                                                                
extended beyond the Italian market. See the press release of Italy’s Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato), 21 February 2000.  
8 Quoted in The Economist, 1 February 2003.  
9  "Ex-KPMG  Execs  Could  Face  Crime  Charges,"  in  the  online  journal  CFO.com,  August  3,  2005,  and  "European 
Regulators Express Concern on Possible US Prosecution of KPMG," Financial Times, July 11, 2005.  
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￿  The  second  approach  focuses  on  making  the  market  contestable  and  opening  its  access  to  new 
entrants. It aims to remove or significantly lower the permanent barriers that hamper the entry of 
new firms into the market for audit services to large international companies – the many obstacles 
identified by the GAO and DTI-FRC studies. This “open-access” approach calls for deeper structural 
changes than the previous one, most notably in legislation and regulation, and can therefore be 
considered more ambitious. The “firm-count” approach essentially aims to restore the competitive 
pressure to what it was in the 1980s; by contrast, ensuring conditions for open access would create 
a situation that has arguably not existed since the First World War, since which there has been no 
durable new entrant into the market for audit services to large international companies
10.  
Whether the priority would be on firm count or open access determines different choices as to the steps 
to be taken.  
￿  The firm-count approach would lead to creating new players, drawing or resources either from the 
Big  Four  firms  or  from  non-Big  Four  firms  or  from  a  mix  of  the  Big  Four  and  non-Big  Four  or 
otherwise. How this could be practically achieved, so that the resulting firms have at least the same 
capability to conduct high-quality audits as the current Big Four firms, is a matter for discussion. I 
know of no in-depth analysis of this question.  
￿  By contrast, the open-access approach would lead to changing the regulatory framework, because 
the current regulatory framework, as is firmly established by the GAO and DTI-FRC studies, does not 
ensure  contestability.  Specifically,  it  would  need  to  create  the  conditions  for  the  very  significant 
investment – in skills and experience, training, IT and knowledge-management systems, brands, 
and other items whose buildup requires significant effort, time, and money – that would allow a new 
entrant to credibly offer audit services to large international companies with a level of quality at 
least equivalent to the one provided by the current Big Four firms. The capital requirement for such 
investment, if it were to be made by a new firm, is practically incompatible with the notion that 
audit firms should be majority-owned by individual chartered auditors, which is a major feature of 
current auditing regulations in most countries. Providing practical possibilities to mobilize significant 
capital for investment would be the key to open market access to new entrants.  
 
Firm Structure and Audit Quality 
To  evaluate  the  different possible  future  steps,  it is  necessary  to  better  understand  the  relationship 
between the structure of audit firms and the quality of audits.  
Currently,  the  Big  Four  are  international  networks  of  national  firms.  The  exact  structure  of  the 
international network varies from one brand to another, but it is always designed to ensure the legal 
autonomy of each constituent national firm, so that it is not affected by legal risks in other countries – 
most crucially, that the non-US national firms are not subject to US litigation risk. At the same time, the 
network structure has to be strong enough to ensure (i) a minimum level of quality in each national firm 
and (ii) sufficient coordination and economies of scale between the national firms.  
The national firms are subject to national legislation and their structure and legal status therefore varies 
from  one  country  to  another,  e.g.  partnerships  or  commercial  entities.  Almost  invariably,  they  are 
owned by individual partners who share the liability of the firm. In some countries, such as Germany or 
Spain, this liability is limited or can be limited by contractual arrangements with clients; in some others, 
such as France, the UK or the US, no such “liability cap” currently exists. (The issue of liability cap 
mechanisms is further developed in my answer to question Q6 below.)  
The individual liability of each partner is determined both by national legislation and by firm-specific 
arrangements and insurance mechanisms.  
The  relationship  between  international  network  structure,  national  firm  structure,  individual  partner 
liability  mechanisms  on  the  one  hand,  and  audit  quality  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  generally  poorly 
understood one. This is partly because so little is known about the former items.  
For progress to be made, a helpful input would be more detailed information than is currently available 
from the audit firms and networks, including the Big Four firms, on their own governance and financials 
at national and international level. This could include information about insurance costs and contingent 
liabilities,  as  well  as  information  about  the  firms’  processes  to  detect  and  to  punish  malpractice.  In 
                                                 
10 The respective dates of creation were: 1845 for Deloitte; 1849 for Price (Price Waterhouse in 1874); 1854 for 
Coopers and 1898 for Lybrand (merged in 1957); 1890 for Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft, subsequently merged 
with Peat (est. 1867) and Marwick (est. 1887); 1894 for Arthur Young & Co; 1899 for Touche Ross; 1903 for Ernst & 
Ernst; and 1913 for Arthur Andersen.   
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effect, the nature of incentives and constraints applying to audit partners and firms in most countries is 
currently shrouded in opaqueness. Absent regulatory requirements (which are already stronger in the 
UK  than  in  most  other  countries),  the  public  information  provided  by  audit  firms  and  networks  is 
generally kept at a level which makes it difficult to make an informed judgment, especially regarding the 
effects  of  the  market’s  structure.  Therefore,  by  improving  their  level  of  disclosure  audit  firms  and 
networks would have much to bring to the public debate on auditing.  
Such insight would be crucial to assess whether the legal limitations that currently exist on audit firm 
ownership and access to external capital are effectively conducive to audit quality. As previously said, 
providing the possibility of access to external capital could be a key element in enabling new entrants to 
offer audit services to large international companies. However, this should obviously not come at the 
price of lower audit quality.  
 
Conclusions 
The FRC is right to emphasize the issue of choice in the audit market. It is an important issue. It is not 
self-solving in the current regulatory environment. It is also an international issue. The UK, being the 
birthplace of modern audit firms and a vibrant financial centre, can take leadership in the international 
debate but non-UK players, including the SEC and the European Commission, should vigorously commit 
themselves to this debate as well.  
Too  little  is  still  publicly  known  about  the  mechanics  of  the  audit  market  for  concrete  steps  to  be 
recommended yet. The FRC should encourage international audit networks to disclose more about their 
internal governance and liability arrangements and their financial data at international level, so that the 
public debate on the audit market can be informed on facts rather than assumptions. It should foster a 
better public understanding of the relationship between the structure of international public networks, 
the ownership structure of individual audit firms (in the UK and elsewhere), the liability and incentive 
mechanisms at firm level and at partner level, and audit quality. And it should encourage debate on 
which  option  would  be  most  productive  between  the  “firm-count”  and  “open-access”  approaches  as 
described above, if choice is to be increased. Such efforts should be undertaken as soon as possible.  
 
- - - 
 
Q1. Do you agree that the focus of the debate should be on the degree of choice in the market for audit 
services to large public companies, rather than other features of this market?  
Yes. Specifically, the focus should be on the relation between choice and audit quality. While the price of 
audit services is a legitimate concern for issuers, it does not currently appear to be a cause of major 
concern from a public-interest point of view. Furthermore, price increases can be as much linked to 
regulatory  changes,  such  as  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  in  the  US,  as  to  the  particular  features  of  the 
market structure.  
 
Q2. What do you regard as the most important criteria for evaluating any opportunities for mitigating 
risks arising from the level of choice in the audit market? 
The primary aim of any new steps should be to increase the confidence of the public and of market 
participants in the quality of audited corporate reporting. Audit firms play a central role in promoting the 
quality  of  corporate  reporting,  both  by  their  participation  in  the  financial  reporting  standard-setting 
process  and  by  their  role  in  enforcing  financial  reporting  standards  and  promoting  a  high  quality  of 
disclosure.  
 
Q3.  We  invite  views  on  how  different  groups,  acting  individually  or  collectively,  could  increase  the 
propensity of non-Big Four or new firms to seek to be major players in the market for audits of large 
companies […].  
Making  credible  inroads  into  the  market  now  dominated  by  the  Big  Four  firms  would  entail  a  very 
significant investment for any non-Big Four new entrant. Therefore, the question here is how sufficient 
resources could be mobilized in a credible way for such investment. This applies both to existing firms  
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which haven’t entered the market of audit services to large international companies, and to possible new 
firms that would enter this market.  
One  key  consideration  is  whether  the  current  constraints  on  audit  firms’  ownership  by  individuals, 
including those set out by the European Union’s eighth directive on Statutory Audit, are indispensable to 
guarantee audit quality. There are two aspects to this question:  
￿  Are  the  rules  on  firms’  ownership  efficient  in  ensuring  their  stated  aims  of  independence  and 
integrity, including in the Big Four worldwide networks, with their current structure of incentives and 
mutual insurance mechanisms?  
￿  What  alternative  mechanisms  could  ensure  sufficient  independence  and integrity  of  audit  service 
providers, supposing a partial or total exemption of the rules on partners’ ownership and liability?  
These questions, as outlined earlier in this memorandum, require more public debate than has been the 
case until now.  
It may be noted here that the “joint audit” system, by which large companies are required to have their 
financial statements audited by two separate firms (as is the case in France), has allowed a number of 
non-Big Four firms to thrive, but does not provide an answer to the question asked by the FRC. Joint 
audit allows non-Big Four firms to be involved in the audit of large companies but apparently not to the 
extent that they could compete with Big Four firms for the full extent of their services. This is evidenced 
by the fact that while a number of large French companies have a non-Big Four firm as joint auditor 
alongside a Big Four firm, very few (and ever fewer) have two non-Big Four firms as joint auditors. 
Furthermore, I know of no comprehensive assessment of the positive or negative impact of the joint 
audit system on audit quality.  
 
Q4. We invite views on how the propensity of companies and their audit committees to purchase audit 
services from non-Big Four firms could be increased […].  
My view is that the main obstacle to non-Big Four firms becoming the auditors of large international 
companies resides in such firms’ actual capabilities or lack of them. Therefore, while companies should 
certainly be encouraged to give a chance to new entrants, it is doubtful that this encouragement alone 
can have any material impact on the structure of the market for audit services. In other words, the 
focus of attention in the choice debate should remain on the “supply side” rather than the “demand 
side”.  
 
Q5. We invite views on: (a) the combination of steps that would be most likely to lead to increased 
choice; (b) whether these steps could be taken forward by market participants, or whether existing laws 
and regulations may constrain or prevent this; (c) the costs of the steps relative to the risks arising from 
the existing or potential degree of concentration in the market.  
There is no denying the importance of the problem of choice in the audit market. However, it is difficult 
for me at this stage to firmly recommend any specify policy steps to alleviate it. Several questions would 
need addressing before such a recommendation can be made, especially those listed in the first part of 
this  memorandum  on  auditors’  and  audit  firms’  liability,  audit  firms’  ownership  rules,  the  desirable 
changes in the audit market’s long-term structure, and the requirements on the internal organization of 
international networks of national audit firms to foster audit quality.  
 
Q6. We invite views on steps that could be taken to mitigate the risk of unnecessary withdrawal of a 
firm from the market […].  
It  is  not  clear  what  should  be  considered  an  “unnecessary”  withdrawal  of  a  firm  from  the  market. 
Mergers such as the one between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in 1998 were driven by 
market forces and have not been stopped at the time by regulators. To my knowledge there is currently 
no talk of such voluntary combination among the Big Four firms.  
It is highly debatable whether the disappearance of Arthur Andersen in 2002 was “unnecessary”. Beyond 
the firm’s involvement in high-profile cases such as Waste Management, WorldCom and of course Enron, 
several  studies  have  highlighted  the  degradation  of  the  quality  of  its  internal  controls  and  of  its 
collective ethics in the years preceding its demise. That even Paul Volcker was not able to save Arthur 
Andersen is an indication that it was a difficult case indeed.   
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Generally speaking, it is not self-evident that significant public or collective efforts should be made to 
preserve audit firms which do not meet high standards of integrity.  
Audit  firms  have  advocated  publicly  enforced  caps  on  their  liability  or  the  possibility  to  limit  it  by 
agreement  with  audit  clients,  reflecting  provisions  that  currently  exist  in  several  countries  including 
Belgium, Germany and Spain. This proposal has been relayed by the US Chamber of Commerce in a 
recent  paper
11.  However,  there  is  no  obvious  argument,  other  than  the  desire  to  preserve  existing 
entities, which would justify that the legal incentives and checks that apply to audit firms should be 
different from those that apply to other market participants. Furthermore, a contractual limitation of 
liability agreed between an auditor and a corporate client could bear the risk of having a negative overall 
impact on the quality of financial information, by diminishing the incentives for audit quality. In any 
case, it is far from obvious that a liability cap mechanism would have been sufficient to save Arthur 
Andersen in 2002, or would potentially save any of the current Big Four firms from a future crisis. One 
of the main assets of large audit firms is their reputation for integrity and should remain so. It remains 
to be seen how new legislation to create liability cap mechanisms would contribute to this reputation.  
A different risk is that of a Big Four audit firm voluntarily leaving the assurance market. Evaluating the 
likelihood  of  such  an  event  would  require  information  on  the  firms’  governance,  liability  risks  and 
financial  structure,  at  international  and  not  only  UK  level.  As  mentioned  previously,  the  Big  Four 
networks would make a significant contribution to the public debate by providing more disclosure on 
their own governance arrangements and financials in major markets and at international level.  
 
Q7. We invite views on steps that could be taken to mitigate the effects of a voluntary or involuntary 
withdrawal of a firm from the audit market […].  
In the previously mentioned paper of the US Chamber of Commerce, former PCAOB Chairman William 
McDonough is quoted as having said, “none of us [regulators] has a clue what to do if one of the Big 
Four failed”.  
The disappearance of one of the Big Four would compound the difficulties already inherent in the current 
market structure and would arguably create a rapidly unsustainable situation. In such an event, there 
would  probably  be  short-term  pressure  for  regulators  to  quickly  re-establish  a  more  diverse  supply, 
possibly by means of a mandatory break-up of the remaining Big Three.  
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11 “Auditing: A Profession at Risk”, US Chamber of Commerce, January 2006.  